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Abstract 
Feeling of Rightness (FOR) is a metacognitive experience accompanying people’s intuitive 
answers that predicts subsequent answer changes (Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 
2011). Previous research suggested cues that influence FOR also affect the ease with which an 
answer comes to mind, namely answer fluency. An issue that remains to be addressed is whether 
answer fluency drives the effect of FOR on subsequent behaviours pertaining to answer changes. 
The goal of a series of four experiments was to examine the relationship between FOR, answer 
fluency, and people’s reanswer choices. Reasoners (N = 64) in each experiment were asked to 
determine the validity of 32 syllogisms that consisted of two models, single-model and multiple-
models. Each syllogism was randomly paired with a question containing either a high anchor 
value (80% or 90%) or a low anchor value (10% or 20%). Reasoners then provided a FOR rating 
on a scale from 0 to 100 along with their reanswer choice for the first two experiments. The last 
two experiments served as the control experiments for which we removed the FOR judgements. 
Results suggested that influencing FOR without affecting answer fluency had no effect on 
people’s subsequent reanswer choices. That is, when answers came to mind slowly, FORs were 
lower and people were more likely to choose to reanswer the problems. Possible explanations 
and limitations were further discussed in the paper.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
According to researchers at Cornell University, we make 226.7 decisions about food 
alone every day (Wansink & Sobal, 2007). Among the substantial choices we make each day, 
why do we choose to reflect on some decisions over others? In a multiple-choice exam, why do 
we change some answers, but not others? The answer may be a metacognitive one. 
Metacognition refers to the processes that monitor people’s ongoing thought activities and 
processes that control the allocation of their mental resources (Nelson, 1990). Its function is 
analogous to a working thermostat that passively measures room temperature and controls the 
initiation and termination of the furnace. This thesis addresses issues of metacognitive 
monitoring and control as they apply to reasoning, which is also denoted as meta-reasoning.  
1.1 Meta-Reasoning  
Ackerman and Thompson (2017) developed a meta-reasoning framework to account for 
the processes that monitor and control people’s reasoning and problem-solving activities based 
on the metamemory literature. The concept Judgement of Learning (JOL) in metamemory 
measures people’s estimate of how well they have learned particular information, which directly 
influences their subsequent study choices (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Son & Metcalfe, 2000). When 
asked to memorize word pairs, people would be less likely to restudy the ones that they believed 
they would certainly recall on a later test. Similarly, when reasoners are asked to solve a 
reasoning task, their solution is posited to contain the answer itself and a metacognitive 
experience that accompanies it, which is referred to as the Feeling of Rightness (FOR) 
(Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson, Evans, & Campbell, 2013). Analogous to JOL, FOR can 
influence people’s subsequent behaviours such as rethinking time and answer changes. As 
described next, FOR has been investigated in experiments using the two-response paradigm.  
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1.2. Relationship Between FOR and Reanswer Behaviours 
In the two-response reasoning paradigm, reasoners are asked to provide a quick intuitive 
answer to each reasoning problem after which they are given as much time as they need to solve 
the problem again (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). Rethinking time is measured as the response 
time of the second answer, and an answer change occurs when people reflect on their initial 
answer and change it on their second response. Previous research has shown that higher FOR 
judgements were associated with less rethinking time and lower likelihood of an answer change 
on a variety of reasoning tasks including base-rate problems, syllogisms, Wason’s selection task, 
and denominator neglect (Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2013; Thompson & Johnson, 
2014). In other words, if reasoners were confident that their answers were correct (i.e., high 
FOR), they would spend less time rethinking the problems and were less likely to change their 
original answers.  
1.3. Predictors of FOR 
Metacognitive judgements such as Judgements of Learning (JOLs) are not based on 
access to memory content, but the experiences associated with generating the item (Koriat, 
2007). As such, they are based inferentially on cues, and are accurate only to the extent the cues 
are accurate. These cues include encoding fluency (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 
1989; Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003; Undorf & Erdelder, 2011), font size 
(Rhodes & Castel, 2008), and retrieval latency of relevant information (Benjamin, Bjork, & 
Schwartz, 1998). 
Similarly, FOR is also cue-based and inferential, and these cues can affect FOR without 
influencing accuracy on the task (Bajšanski, Močibob, & Valerjev, 2014; Bajšanski, Zauhar, & 
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Valerjev, 2018; Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009; Quayle & Ball, 2000; Shynkaruk & 
Thompson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2011). These studies have shown that a reasoner’s answer 
confidence judgements and accuracy are not well aligned in many reasoning domains, as 
indicated by the low correlations between the two variables. These results suggest that people 
can feel that they are right even when they are wrong.  
One cue that has been demonstrated to influence FOR is answer fluency, the ease with 
which an answer comes to mind. There are two ways to experimentally identify such cues: 
correlation and manipulation. These two methods differ in that the latter involves directly 
manipulating independent variables while measuring and collecting behaviours such as response 
time that are associated with reasoning, which allows the interpretation of causation. However, 
prior attempts to manipulate FOR as described below were indirect in that they also affected 
answer fluency (Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2013). Thus, it is less clear whether 
FOR per se predicts people’s subsequent choices or answer fluency is the key that drives FOR 
and people’s choices. 
 Thompson and colleagues (2011) manipulated FOR using base-rate and syllogistic 
problems with the two-response paradigm. In a classic base-rate task, participants are given two 
pieces of information: the probability of an individual belonging to one of two groups which is 
referred to as the base rate, and a personal description that favours membership in one of the two 
groups. When the two pieces of information point to the same group, the problem is considered 
non-conflicting; it is conflicting otherwise. It was found that FORs were lower for conflicting 
problems than for their non-conflicting counterparts, but the latter was also more fluent than the 
former in terms of response time (RT). In addition, there were longer rethinking times and a 
greater probability of answer change for conflict than non-conflict problems. For each person, 
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Thompson et al. (2011) also took the median RT of the initial responses, and compared FORs for 
RTs greater than and less than the median. Answers that were fluently generated (less than the 
median RT) were given higher FORs than their less fluent counterparts. These data revealed that 
answer fluency affected FORs which in turn led to the downstream behaviours associated with 
rethinking time and answer change. 
In two further studies, Thompson and colleagues (2011, 2013) manipulated the 
availability of heuristics as a way to influence FOR. On a syllogistic reasoning task, the min 
heuristic is a non-logical shortcut for determining the validity of conclusions by evaluating how 
informative the premises and conclusion are (Thompson et al., 2011). Additionally, in a modified 
version of the Wason selection task, participants were given rules in the form of conditional 
statements (e.g., if p then q), and cards with a letter on one side and a number on the other side 
(Thompson et al., 2013). Their task was to determine whether the rule was true or false by 
evaluating each card. Results showed that participants using a two-response paradigm processed 
matching trials more fluently than non-matching trials when the matching heuristic (i.e. choosing 
cards with names mentioned in the rule) was available for use (Thompson et al., 2013). Of note, 
however, is the finding that answers generated by the heuristics were more fluent and given 
higher FORs than those that were not, and rethinking time was shorter and answer changes were 
less frequent for these corresponding problems. The two prior studies showed people’s 
subsequent reanswering behaviours were determined by cues affecting FOR as well as answer 
fluency; thus, it was difficult to tease apart the effects generated by FOR from answer fluency.  
To summarize, previous research showed the role of FOR in predicting people’s 
reanswering behaviours (Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2013); however, correlations 
between answer fluency and FOR were consistently observed such that each variable that 
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affected FOR and the downstream behavioural effects (i.e., answer change) also affected fluency. 
Therefore, the question that remains to be answered is whether manipulating FOR per se would 
be sufficient to predict people’s subsequent reanswering behaviours independently of answer 
fluency. It is important to answer this question because it would shed light on the mechanism of 
meta-reasoning. Therefore, the goal of the following experiments was to examine the role of 
FOR in relation to subsequent reanswering choices by using a cue that directly manipulated 
FOR, and a cue that indirectly affected FOR (through the effect of answer fluency). To this end, 
as is explained next, we employed an “anchoring” manipulation as a cue that could directly 
influence FOR without affecting fluency.  
1.4. Anchoring  
Anchoring occurs when people incorporate a previously encountered value into a 
subsequent estimate, even when that value is irrelevant to the estimate. That is, people would 
generally provide a higher estimate if they encounter a high initial number. In a demonstration 
conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), participants judged whether the proportion of 
African nations in the UN was higher or lower than an arbitrary anchor. The anchor point was 
determined by spinning a wheel of fortune, which was witnessed by the participants. Participants 
who encountered a higher anchor (i.e., 65%) gave higher estimates than those who saw a lower 
anchor (i.e., 10%).  
Several theories attempt to explain the cognitive mechanisms of the anchoring effect, but 
two popular theories are the selective-accessibility theory and the scale distortion theory. The 
selective-accessibility theory posits that information relevant to the anchor value are activated, 
which causes people to give estimates that are consistent with it (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; 
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). For example, when asked to estimate 
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the price of a car after encountering a high anchor, features that are associated with an expensive 
car are activated such as a powerful engine. As a result, people tend to estimate a higher price for 
the car. The scale distortion theory on the other hand provides an alternative account, suggesting 
that the anchoring effect is caused by the distortion of the psychological scale (Frederick & 
Mochon, 2012). Based on the contrast effect (e.g., a dark room is perceived darker after walking 
out from a bright room), a large number on a scale feels even larger when the anchor value is 
small. As a result, people are likely to adjust their scale by moving towards to the smaller 
number in order to compensate for the distortion. Although the underlying cognitive mechanisms 
of the anchoring effect are still under study, the anchoring effect is a robust phenomenon which 
has been extensively studied in persuasion, attitude, judgments and decision-making (for review, 
see Furnham & Boo, 2011). However, it has not been widely investigated as a potential cue to 
examine metacognitive judgments, but the available data suggest that anchoring can be used to 
manipulate metacognitive judgements such as JOL (England & Serra, 2012; Yang, Sun, & 
Shanks, 2017; Zhao, 2012; Zhao and Linderholm, 2011), and by extension, FOR.  
Specifically, Zhao and Linderholm (2011) and Zhao (2012) explored the anchoring effect 
on metacomprehension, which is people's ability to judge their own understanding of text 
materials. Participants were given texts to study and were asked about how well they would 
perform on future tests for the materials they just studied. Prior to providing their judgements, 
anchor values in the form of information on past peer performance with the same study content 
was shown to the participants. Participants who received high anchors (95%) gave higher 
judgements for their performance compared to those who saw low anchors (55%). Zhao (2012) 
also examined the effect of anchoring on people's retrospective judgments. Participants were 
asked to evaluate how well they did on a comprehension test on a scale from 0 – 100% after 
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studying for and taking the test. Again, participants who saw high-anchor information before 
rating their comprehension made higher retrospective metacomprehension judgements than those 
who encountered low-anchor information. A similar study was conducted using peer 
performance information as anchor values in a task of studying paired-associate words, and the 
results were consistent with prior Zhao and colleagues’ findings (England & Serra, 2012).  
In these studies, the anchoring values were informative, in that they provided participants 
with relevant information about peer performance of the same task. When the anchor values 
were irrelevant to the task performance, namely uninformative anchors, the relationship between 
anchoring and the metacognitive judgements was less clear (England & Serra, 2012; Zhao, 2012; 
Zhao and Linderholm, 2011). To address this gap in the research and to elucidate the role of 
anchoring in metamemory monitoring and control, Yang et al. (2017) conducted a set of 
experiments. In one of their experiments, participants studied a weakly-associated word-pair and 
were then told to answer the question “Is the likelihood you would be able to remember the 
preceding word pair in 5 min higher or lower than [10%/20%/30%/70%/80%/90%]?” In contrast 
to providing information about past peer performance, the anchoring information in this case 
presumably had no relevance to performing the task. Low anchors were comprised of 10%, 20%, 
and 30%, whereas high anchors were made up of 70%, 80%, and 90%. Each anchor value was 
randomly assigned to the word-pair, and each anchor value appeared equally often. Participants 
then provided a JOL score from 0 to 100, indicating the probability that they would be able to 
remember the pair in 5 min. Although the actual recall performance was not different between 
the high-anchor and low-anchor condition, JOLs were rated higher on high-anchor word-pairs 
compared to low-anchor counterparts. In the fourth experiment, participants were instructed to 
provide their restudy choices after making each JOL. More specifically, the participants 
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indicated whether they would like to study the previous word-pair again after they had seen all 
the word-pairs, although, in reality, the word pairs were not presented to them the second time. 
Consistent with Yang et al.’s (2017) previous findings, JOLs for the high-anchor word-pairs 
were higher than for low-anchor word-pairs, and participants chose fewer high-anchor pairs for 
restudy than their low-anchor counterparts. These results indicated that anchoring can produce a 
downstream effect on participants. In light of prior research on the anchoring effect in the 
restudy choices, we used anchor values in our experiments in order to directly influence people’s 
FOR judgements of the task. We reasoned that anchor values were shown after participants 
provided their answers; thus, the anchoring effect would not affect answer fluency. Additionally, 
in order to test whether variables that affect FOR without affecting fluency would also influence 
reanswer choices, the reasoning task used in our experiments was syllogisms. 
1.5. Models in Syllogistic Reasoning 
Syllogisms represent a form of deductive reasoning. Each syllogism is made up of three 
statements, which include two premises and a conclusion. The conclusion of each syllogism 
contains two terms (e.g., A and C) presented in each premise, and a B term is always repeated in 
the premises. The reasoning task used in our experiments required participants to judge the 
validity of the syllogism’s conclusion. Here is an example of one syllogism:  
 
All of A are B. 
All of B are C. 
Therefore, all of A are C. 
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The mental model account of syllogistic reasoning posits that people start by constructing 
a single mental model that represents the relationships denoted by the premises (Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 1991). People subsequently derive a conclusion that is consistent with the initial 
model. In the case where a conclusion is presented for evaluation of its validity (i.e., does it 
follow logically from the premises), people test if the conclusion is consistent with the model. 
They should then need to test the conclusion against the possible alternative models of the 
premises, although people often neglect this step and end up accepting invalid conclusions. If it 
is not consistent with any other possible model, the conclusion is rejected. A valid conclusion is 
one that logically follows and is necessitated by the premises given; an invalid conclusion may 
be consistent with some of the possible models, but is not necessitated by the premises.  
The number of models that can be used to represent the premises is related to the 
difficulty of the problem, which was a variable that was manipulated in the following 
experiments. We assumed we would be able to manipulate answer fluency by manipulating 
problem difficulty. Single-model problems require the construction of one model to determine 
the validity of the conclusion, whereas at least two models are needed for multiple-model ones. 
Examples of single-model and multiple-model syllogisms are shown below on the left and right 
respectively:  
 
            All of the dentists are painters.                         None of the dentists are painters. 
            All of the painters are bicyclists.                      All of the painters are bicyclists. 
Therefore, some bicyclists are dentists.           Therefore, some bicyclists are not dentists. 
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Previous study found that people spent more time solving multiple-model syllogisms than 
their single-model counterparts (Copeland & Radvansky, 2004). Due to prior use of response 
time as a proxy measure for answer fluency (Thompson et al., 2011,2013), we could use the 
difficulty variable (i.e., number of models required to deduce validity) to examine the effect of 
FOR on reanswer choices through the fluency effect. 
In addition to slower response times, the accuracy of syllogistic reasoning tends to 
decrease as the number of models increases (Bara, Bucciarelli, & Johnson-Laird, 1995; Johnson-
Laird & Bara, 1984; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000; Quayle & Ball, 2000). One explanation 
for this is that people often represent only one mental model, which is adequate for single-model 
problems, but multiple-model syllogisms require people to search for, represent (two or more 
mental models) and test alternative representations of the premises, which is more cognitively 
demanding (Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006). Contrary to this research, however, Prowse-
Turner and Thompson (2009) did not observe an accuracy difference between the two types, but 
single-model syllogisms were rated higher on confidence judgments than their multiple-model 
counterparts. Therefore, this study provided evidence that confidence judgement can be 
dissociated from accuracy. Other studies have also shown confidence as a poor indicator of 
accuracy in syllogistic reasoning (Bajšanski & Močibob, 2014; Quayle & Ball, 2000; Shynkaruk 
& Thompson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2011). Therefore, we predicted higher FORs for single-
model and fluent problems than their counterparts independently of accuracy.  
1.6. Summary  
We attempted to investigate the role of FOR in predicting reanswer choices in syllogistic 
reasoning. To this end, we exploited a cue that was predicted to directly affect FOR, which was 
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the size of anchors, and a cue that was predicted to influence FOR through the effect of answer 
fluency, which was the number of models.  
In the first two experiments, we showed participants a random, uninformative anchor 
after they had solved each syllogism, and then asked them to give a FOR judgement based on 
their previous response. Given that participants provided their validity responses before seeing 
the anchor values, the effect of anchoring should not affect the participant’s response time, which 
is a proxy measure of answer fluency. Participants then indicated their reanswer choice for the 
previous problem, that is, they indicated whether they would like to solve the preceding problem 
again in order to improve their overall score. In reality, they never solved the problems again. 
This measure of reanswer choices differed from previous studies, which examined people’s 
actual behaviours of reconsideration and answer change (Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et 
al., 2013), but was similar to the measures used in Yang et al.’s anchoring study (2017). We 
conducted two more experiments for which the FOR question was eliminated. The purpose of 
these experiments was to ensure participants’ performance was not influenced by the act of 
providing their FOR ratings.  
We formulated two alternative hypotheses regarding the relationships among answer 
fluency, FOR, and reanswer choices (see Figure 1.1). Hypothesis A: FOR can be predicted by 
anchor values and number of models (i.e., single- and multiple-model), which in turn, would 
affect people’s reanswer choices as illustrated in Figure 1.1a. More specifically, we predicted 
that people would give higher FORs for high-anchor problems and for single-model syllogisms 
than their counterparts, and they would also be less likely to choose to reanswer these problems. 
Hypothesis B: only cues that affect the experience of answer fluency (i.e., number of models) 
would predict subsequent reanswer choices as depicted in Figure 1.1b. Those cues that do not 
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influence answer fluency may affect FOR, but they would not have any effects on reanswer 
choices. Therefore, answer fluency is the key factor for predicting reanswer choices. According 
to this hypothesis, we predicted that the number of models would influence answer fluency and 
FOR, which in turn would affect reanswer choices. On the other hand, anchoring would only 
affect FOR, but not reanswer choices.  
All four experiments followed a within-subject design. Data were analyzed with a 2 
(Anchor [low, high]) x 2 (Model [single, multiple]) x 2 (Validity [valid, invalid]) repeated-
measures ANOVA. 
 
 
(a) Hypothesis A                                                    (b) Hypothesis B 
Figure 1.1 Flowcharts depicting two hypothesized paths of FORs in the current experiments. 
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Chapter 2. Experiment 1 
The paradigm used in Experiment 1 closely matched the study conducted by Yang et al. 
(2017). We examined the effect of uninformative anchors on FORs and as well as reanswer 
choices. Reasoners were instructed to solve the syllogisms intuitively in order to be consistent 
with previous work on FOR (Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2013). The responses 
collected were FORs, reading time (i.e., the time people spent reading the syllogisms), response 
time (i.e., the time from people finishing reading the questions to giving their responses), 
reanswer choices, and accuracy. To obtain a proxy measure of answer fluency, we summed 
response time and reading time. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants  
Sixty-four participants (35 females, 29 males, M = 22 years) were recruited from the 
University of Saskatchewan. They took part in the study for partial course credit. 
2.1.2. Materials 
The reasoning task was performed on a Microsoft Windows laptop computer with a 1920 
x 1080 resolution display. Text instructions and stimuli were presented in black with an 18-point 
Courier New font, displayed on a white background. 
Participants solved 32 syllogisms and 4 practice problems in the E-Prime 2.0 Software 
Tools program (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The reason we chose to include 32 
stimuli was that this is a 2 (model) x 2 (anchor) x 2 (validity) repeated-measures within-subject 
design, and thus, each cell contained 4 items. Each of the syllogisms was comprised of 2 two-
term premises (e.g., All of the “A” are “B”; All of the “B” are “C”) and a conclusion that related 
the “A” and “C” term (e.g., Therefore, some “C” are “A”). The A, B, and C terms all referred to 
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occupations (see Table 2.1 for examples). Among the syllogisms we used, 16 were from a 
published study (Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009), and we created the remaining 16 
syllogisms and the practice problems. To be consistent with the materials used in the previous 
study (Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009), three moods (see Appendix A for details) were 
chosen for the single-model problems (AA, IA, and AI) and four moods were chosen for the 
multiple-model problems (AE, EA, IE, and EI). We also attempted to control for another factor 
in syllogisms called “figure” , which refers to the sequence in which the A, B and C terms are 
presented (See Appendix A for details). Participants received six Figure-1, four Figure-2, and six 
Figure-4 single-model syllogisms. Figure-3 single-model problems were not included because 
we attempted to be consistent with previous research (Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009). 
Participants were also presented with five Figure-1, four Figure-2, two Figure-3, and five Figure-
4 multiple-model problems. Additionally, the AC and CA conclusion orders were equally likely.  
Table 2.1. Examples of syllogisms used in the experiment. 
 
Valid Invalid 
Single-model All of the dentists are painters. 
All of the painters are bicyclists. 
Therefore, some bicyclists are 
dentists. 
Some of the gardeners are psychologists. 
All of the gardeners are models. 
Therefore, all psychologists are models. 
Multiple-
model 
None of the dentists are painters. 
All of the painters are bicyclists. 
Therefore, some bicyclists are not 
dentists.  
All of the gardeners are psychologists. 
None of the models are gardeners. 
Therefore, some psychologists are 
models. 
 
The validity of the syllogisms was manipulated such that half of the syllogisms were 
valid and the other half were invalid. Assuming all premises were true, valid syllogisms were 
those that necessarily followed from the premises. Invalid syllogisms were possibly true given 
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the premises1, but were not necessitated by them (see Table 2.1 for examples). To control for any 
possible effect of content on validity, we counterbalanced the content of the syllogisms and 
created four lists to ensure that the occupation-related content in each premise pair was 
accompanied by two valid and two invalid conclusions.  
The number of models was another variable we manipulated in the experiment. Sixteen 
problems were single-model, and the remaining 16 were multiple-model. Again, single-model 
syllogisms require the construction of one mental model to determine the validity of the 
conclusions, whereas at least two models are needed for multiple-model syllogisms.  
Uninformative anchors were presented to the participants in the form of this question: “If 
you see the previous problem again, is the likelihood you would be able to solve it correctly 
higher or lower than [Anchor]%?” The anchor values were made up of low numbers (10 and 20) 
and high numbers (80 and 90). Each anchor value was randomly assigned to a syllogism. In 
addition, each type of syllogism was paired with an equal number of low and high anchors. For 
example, valid single-model syllogisms were accompanied by two of 10%, two of 20%, two of 
80%, and two of 90% anchors.  
2.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were group-tested with an experimenter present. They were given brief 
instructions about the experiment and were told to solve the reasoning problems with their 
intuition. To familiarize themselves with the task procedure, participants began with 4 practice 
problems. The order of the problems was randomized, and they were presented on the screen one 
at a time. The event sequence is displayed in Figure 2.1. On each trial, participants saw two 
                                               
1 Half of the invalid problems are often falsely endorsed as valid because they are consistent with the first model 
people generate (Evans et al., 1999). People tend to accept the conclusions from these invalid problems rather than 
rejecting them, even though the latter is the correct response. 
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premises and a conclusion with a dashed line in the middle. Once they read the syllogism, 
participants pressed the space bar to continue. The interval between the onset of the problem to 
pressing the space bar was recorded as the reading time. After pressing the space bar, the 
question that pertained to the validity of the conclusion appeared directly below the problem. 
Participants chose 1 on the keyboard if they thought the conclusion followed logically from the 
premises; they chose 3 otherwise. The time required to do so was marked as their response time. 
After that, they answered the following question about their reanswer choices: “If you see the 
previous problem again, is the likelihood you would be able to solve it correctly higher or lower 
than [Anchor]%?” Participants chose either higher or lower for this question. They then provided 
their FOR ratings from 0 to 100, indicating how right they felt about their previous answer. 
Participants were asked about whether they would like to solve this problem again after they 
have solved all the problems to improve their overall score. In fact, no problems were presented 
to them the second time. There was a manipulation check in the end, asking participants if they 
actually answered with their intuition.  
  
 
17 
 
Figure 2.1. The trial progression for Experiment 1.  
 
2.2. Results 
Trials with missing FORs (i.e., the enter key was pressed without a numerical value) 
were discarded. Additionally, trials on which participants reported that they failed to provide an 
intuitive answer were also excluded from further analyses, which was about 4.8% of the data2. A 
2 (Anchor [low, high]) x 2 (Model [single, multiple]) x 2 (Validity [valid, invalid]) repeated-
measures ANOVA was performed on 4 dependent variables: FORs, reanswer choices, composite 
                                               
2 We also examined the effect of outliers on the data for all of the experiments. Removing RTs that were longer than 
2 standard deviations away from the mean RT for each participant resulted in no significant changes. Therefore, we 
proceeded with the analysis without excluding the outliers.  
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RT (the sum of reading time and response time), and accuracy. Results with p < 0.05 were 
reported as significant. Paired t-tests were used to examine the simple main effects of the 
interactions.  
2.2.1. FOR 
The grand mean FOR rating collapsing across all levels of all factors was 82.71. The 
mean FOR in each of the eight cells in the 2 x 2 x 2 design are plotted in Figure 2.2. Consistent 
with our hypotheses, syllogisms paired with low anchors were rated lower on FOR (M = 81.61, 
SD = 1.41) than high-anchor syllogisms (M = 83.81, SD = 1.32), F(1,63) = 7.559, p = .008, ηp2 = 
0.107. As predicted, FORs were higher for single-model syllogisms (M = 84.92, SD = 1.28) than 
for multiple-model syllogisms (M = 80.51, SD = 1.45), F(1,63) = 30.687, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.328. 
There was also a significant interaction between model and validity, F(1,63) = 7.721, p = .007, 
ηp2 = 0.109. Values for the interaction are presented in Table 2.2. People gave higher FORs for 
single-model than for multiple-model syllogisms when the problems were valid (+5.88; t(63) = 
5.019, p < 0.001), but this difference was smaller when the problems were invalid (+3.00; t(63) = 
4.290, p < 0.001).  
 
  
 
19 
 
Figure 2.2. Mean FORs in Experiment 1 as a function of anchor, model and validity. Error bars 
represent standard errors.  
Table 2.2. Mean FORs by model and validity. 
Model Validity Mean Std. Error N 
Single Valid 86.36 1.26 64 
 
Invalid 83.47 1.48 64 
Multiple Valid 80.36 1.59 64 
 
Invalid 80.66 1.49 64 
 
2.2.2. Reanswer choices 
The overall mean probability of reanswering was 0.21. The data are plotted in Figure 2.3. 
Consistent with Hypothesis A and B, participants were less likely to reanswer single-model 
syllogisms (M = 0.18, SD = 0.03) than multiple-model syllogisms (M = 0.23, SD = 0.04), F(1,63) 
= 8.845, p = .004, ηp2 = 0.123. The interaction between model and validity was also significant, 
F(1,63) = 5.010, p = .029, ηp2 = 0.074. Values for the interaction are presented in Table 2.3. 
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When the problems were invalid, people were more likely to reanswer multiple-model 
syllogisms than single-model ones (+0.090; t(63) = 4.797, p < 0.001), but this difference was not 
found in valid problems (+0.015; t(63) = 0.581, p = 0.564). Contrary to Hypothesis A, the main 
effect of anchor was not significant, F(1,63) = 0.007, p = .933, ηp2 < 0.001. 
 
Figure 2.3. Probability of reanswering in Experiment 1 as a function of anchor, model and 
validity. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Table 2.3. Probability of reanswering by model and validity. 
Model Validity Mean Std. Error N 
Single Valid 0.193 0.035 64 
 
Invalid 0.172 0.033 64 
Multiple Valid 0.209 0.036 64 
 
Invalid 0.255 0.037 64 
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2.2.3. Composite RT   
We combined the reading time and the response time in order to calculate the composite 
RT, which served as our proxy for fluency. Twenty-three participants’ reading time data were 
not logged, and therefore, we performed the analysis with 41 participants. The data are presented 
in Figure 5. Participants solved single-model syllogisms faster (M = 14.49, SD = 0.79) than 
multiple-model syllogisms (M = 16.70, SD = 0.96), F(1,40) = 13.955, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.259. 
Furthermore, the model and validity interaction was marginally significant, F(1,40) = 3.833, p 
= .057, ηp2 = 0.087. Values for the interaction are displayed in Table 4. For valid syllogisms, 
participants solved single-model problems faster than multiple-model ones (-2.93; t(40) = -3.380, 
p = 0.002), whereas the difference between composite RT was marginally significant for invalid 
syllogisms (-1.27; t(40) = -1.863, p = 0.07). The size of the anchors had no effect on composite 
RT, F(1, 40) = 1.266, p = .267, ηp2 = 0.031. 
 
Figure 2.4. Mean reading time for Experiment 1 as a function of anchor, model and validity. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Table 2.4. Mean reading time by model and validity 
Model Validity Mean Std. Error N 
Single Valid 13.82 0.79 41 
 
Invalid 15.16 0.97 41 
Multiple Valid 16.94 0.99 41 
 
Invalid 16.46 1.08 41 
 
2.2.4. Accuracy 
The overall mean accuracy was 0.62. Data are plotted in Figure 2.5. Mean accuracy for 
valid syllogisms was higher (M = 0.71, SD = 0.02) than for their invalid counterparts (M = 0.53, 
SD = 0.02), F(1,63) = 36.887, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.369. There was a significant interaction between 
model and validity, F(1,63) = 10.195, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.139. These values are presented in Table 
2.5. When the syllogisms were valid, participants were more accurate for single-model than for 
multiple-model problems (+0.09; t(63) = 2.846, p = 0.006), but this difference was absent for 
invalid syllogisms (-0.04; t(63) = -1.309, p = 0.195). The anchoring effect on accuracy was non-
significant, F(1,63) = 0.610, p = 0.438, ηp2 = 0.010.  
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Figure 2.5. Mean accuracy for Experiment 1 as a function of anchor, model and validity. Error 
bars represent standard errors.  
Table 2.5. Mean accuracy by model and validity of syllogisms 
Model Validity Mean Std. Error N 
Single Valid 0.76 0.03 64 
 
Invalid 0.51 0.02 64 
Multiple Valid 0.66 0.03 64 
 
Invalid 0.56 0.03 64 
 
2.2.5. Fluency Defined by Item RT 
To examine the relationship between fluency, re-answer choices, and FOR, we computed 
a median composite RT (i.e., the sum of reading time and response time) for each participant3. 
                                               
3 We also computed a median reading RT for each of the 41 participants whose reading time was logged. Consistent 
with the composite RT analysis, fluently read problems were given higher FORs (M = 85.95, sd = 11.00) than their 
less fluent counterparts (M = 81.12, sd = 10.82), t(40) = 5.963, p < 0.001. The effect of fluency on re-answer choices 
was only marginally significant, t(40) = -1.748, p = 0.088. However, the trend was similar to the composite RT data, 
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Then, we divided their responses into those that were fluently and disfluently generated. Fluently 
generated answers had composite RTs shorter than the participants’ median composite RT and 
disfluent items had longer composite RTs. Consistent with previous research (Thompson et al., 
2011; Thompson et al., 2013), fluently produced answers were given higher FORs (M = 83.54, 
sd = 10.58) than their disfluent counterparts (M = 81.11, sd = 11.13), t(40) = 4.937, p < 0.001. 
Additionally, we compared FORs for items based on participants’ re-answer choices. FORs for 
the items participants preferred to re-answer (M = 75.47, sd = 15.87) were lower than for those 
they did not prefer to re-answer (M = 83.58, sd = 10.92), t(46) = -3.083, p = 0.003. We also 
examined the fluency effect on re-answer choices, which was also significant, t(40) = -1.998, p = 
0.05. Participants on average preferred reattempting disfluent problems (M = 0.24, sd = 0.26) 
than fluent ones (M = 0.21, sd = 0.27). These analyses suggested that fluently generated 
responses were associated with higher FORs which also lowered participants’ likelihood of 
reattempting the problems.  
2.3. Discussion 
2.3.1. Number of Models 
In the current experiment, we verified that the number of models affected answer fluency. 
That is, people were more fluent at solving single-model syllogisms than multiple-model ones. 
We further observed that people’s FOR ratings were higher for single-model syllogisms than for 
their multiple-model counterparts, and subsequently, they were less likely to choose the former 
to reanswer. These results were consistent with either of our hypotheses, because both 
hypotheses support that FOR can predict reanswer choices when it is influenced by answer 
                                               
in that people were more likely to re-answer disfluent problems (M = 0.23, sd = 0.29) than their fluent counterparts 
(M = 0.19, sd = 0.26).  
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fluency. Evidence from item-based RT analysis also demonstrated the expected relationship 
between FORs and reanswer choices in that FORs were lower for the problems people were 
willing to reattempt. However, the results on the size of anchors provided us with a clearer 
direction.  
2.3.2. Size of Anchors 
We were able to demonstrate the anchoring effect on FOR (Figure 2.2) without affecting 
fluency as shown by the non-significant results on reading time and response time. People gave 
higher FORs to problems paired with high anchor values than their low counterparts without 
affecting answer fluency. However, their reanswer choices were unaffected by the size of the 
anchors. These data exclusively supported Hypothesis B because it seems that only cues that 
influence FORs through the effect of answer fluency can predict subsequent reanswer choices.  
 One possible explanation is that the size of anchors, unlike the number of models, can 
affect the judgement of the experience (i.e., FOR), but not the experience per se. FOR is intended 
to capture the judgement of the experience of being correct, which like other judgements can be 
altered by means such as anchoring (England & Serra, 2012; Yang et al., 2018; Zhao, 2012; 
Zhao and Linderholm, 2011). It is plausible that answer fluency is the source of the actual 
experience, which in turn predicts people’s subsequent reanswer choices. On the other hand, cues 
that directly affect FOR can only influence the judgement of the FOR, but the actual experience 
that is captured by the FOR is unaffected. Based on our item-based RT analysis, FORs were 
lower for less fluent problems, and people tended to reattempt these problems more often than 
their fluent counterparts. In other words, fluency contributed to the sense of being right as 
reflected by the FOR rating, which in turn predicted people’s succeeding reanswer choices. Thus, 
affecting FOR without affecting fluency may remove its behavioural consequences. In the 
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current experiment, the number of models affected fluency which also affected FOR as the 
responses for single-model syllogisms was processed more fluently than multiple-model ones, 
and people were less likely to reanswer the former. In contrast, although FOR was influenced by 
the anchoring effect, the difference in RTs as well as reanswer choices were similar for the low- 
and high-anchor syllogisms. The size of anchors served as an example of affecting FOR without 
affecting fluency, and as a result, people’s subsequent choices were unaffected.  
An alternative explanation is that the anchoring effect on reanswer choices was 
undetectable due to the task and measure we deployed in the experiment. These syllogisms were 
abstract and difficult compared to the task used in previous metamemory research, which was 
memorizing word-pairs (Yang et al., 2018). The difficulty of the reasoning task might have 
reduced people’s overall motivation to reattempt the problems. As a result, the probability of 
people attempting to reanswer in the current experiment was only about 20% compared to the 
likelihood of restudying in previous research which was about 36%. People’s reanswer choices 
might have resulted in a floor effect where the variances produced by the size of anchors could 
not be measured with the current task.  
Another possibility is that FOR does not reliably predict people’s intention to reanswer. 
In the current experiment, participants indicated whether they would like to solve each problem 
again, but in reality, they never solved any of the problems again. In order to be similar to Yang 
et al.’s study (2018), this behavioural measure was different than used in previous research, 
which examined participants’ actual reanswering behaviours such as answer change and 
rethinking time (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2013). 
Participants’ intention might not reflect their actual behaviours; but this account is less likely 
because lower FORs were associated with higher reanswering probabilities within participants. 
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2.3.3. Accuracy  
Cues such as the size of anchors affected people’s FORs, but not their accuracy on the 
reasoning task, suggesting that confidence judgement and accuracy are dissociated. The data 
showed that the anchoring effect can directly bias people’s confidence judgements, while leaving 
accuracy unaffected. Encountering a high anchor may lead us to report higher levels of 
confidence, but we are not necessarily correct. These results provide further support to the 
literature that confidence judgement in reasoning is poorly calibrated with accuracy (Bajšanski & 
Močibob, 2014; Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009; Quayle & Ball, 2000; Shynkaruk & 
Thompson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2011).  
Inconsistent with our expectation, the accuracy of single-model and multiple-model 
problems was similar, but this finding replicated the results found in Prowse Turner and 
Thompson’s study (2009). Again, the single-model syllogisms used in the experiment contained 
several compelling lures such as the “all” word, which invited “all” in the conclusion. It is 
possible that people tended to construct an identity model for the quantifier “all” instead of 
forming a subset of models for it. They alternatively may simply match the quantifier of the 
conclusion with those presented in the premises which is also known as the matching heuristic to 
solve these problems, but in fact, employing this heuristic might be misleading (Wetherick & 
Gilhooly, 1995). For example, in the valid syllogisms below, participants might be tempted to 
infer the conclusion as invalid with the reasoning that the quantifiers “all” in the premises should 
be matched with an “all” quantifier in the conclusion.  
All of the dentists are painters. 
All of the painters are bicyclists. 
Therefore, some bicyclists are dentists. 
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2.3.4. Validity  
The results of the interaction between model and validity showed that people gave higher 
FORs to single-model syllogisms than multiple-model ones when the problems were valid, but 
this difference was not as profound with invalid problems. A similar interaction was present in 
accuracy. We did not anticipate this interaction to occur; therefore, we attempted to replicate this 
effect in the next experiment before making any conclusive inferences.  
In the next experiment, the aim was to confirm the effects of number of models and size 
of anchors on reanswer choices. We attempted to replicate the current study again, but slightly 
changed the instructions by telling the participants “Some of the problems are very difficult.” 
The reason for this was to reduce people’s overall FORs with the hope of increasing the number 
of problems that people choose to reanswer.  
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Chapter 3. Experiment 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the relationships amongst cues, FORs and 
reanswer choices as found in the previous experiment while attempting to make FOR judgements 
more varied by altering the instructions.  
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Sixty-four participants (33 males and 31 females, M = 23 years) were recruited from the 
University of Saskatchewan. They took part in the study for course credit. 
3.1.2. Materials and Procedure 
The stimuli, design and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1, with one 
exception. The instructions of the current study emphasized that “Some of the problems are very 
difficult.” This description was not present in the previous experiment.  
3.2. Results 
Trials with missing FORs and those that were not answered intuitively were excluded 
from further analyses, which accounted for 2.5 % of the data. A 2 (Anchor [low, high]) x 2 
(Model [single, multiple]) x 2 (Validity [valid, invalid]) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
performed on 4 dependent variables: FOR, reanswer choices, composite RT (the sum of reading 
time and response time), and accuracy. Results with p < 0.05 were reported as significant. Paired 
t-tests were employed to reveal the simple main effects for significant interactions.  
3.2.1. FOR 
The mean FOR rating collapsing all levels was 83.82. The FOR data are plotted in 
Figure 3.1. As found in Experiment 1, participants gave higher FORs for single-model 
syllogisms (M = 85.90, SD = 1.56) than for their multiple-model counterparts (M = 81.73, SD = 
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1.73), F(1,63) = 40.148, p < .001, ηp2= 0.389. Once again, they also rated high-anchor syllogisms 
(M = 85.09, SD = 1.53) higher on FOR than low-anchor ones (M = 82.54, SD = 1.80), F(1,63) = 
8.238, p = 0.006, ηp2 = 0.116. The main effect of validity was significant, F(1,63) = 7.623, p = 
0.008, ηp2 = 0.108. Valid syllogisms (M = 84.82, SD = 1.61) were given higher FORs than 
invalid ones (M = 82.82, SD = 1.70). Consistent with Experiment 1, the interaction between 
model and validity was significant, F(1,63) = 6.663, p = 0.012, ηp2= 0.096. The values for the 
interaction are displayed in Table 3.1. To decompose this interaction, people gave higher FORs 
to single-model syllogisms than to multiple-model ones when the problems were valid (+6.13; 
t(63) = 6.392, p < 0.001), but the difference was smaller for invalid problems (+2.24; t(63) = 
2.187, p = 0.032), replicating Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Mean FORs in Experiment 2 as a function of model, anchor, and validity. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
Low High Low High
Valid Invalid
M
ea
n 
FO
Rs
Single
Multiple
  
 
31 
Table 3.1. Mean FORs by model and validity  
Model Validity Mean Std. Error N 
Single Valid 87.88 1.48 63 
 
Invalid 83.93 1.71 63 
Multiple Valid 81.76 1.86 63 
 
Invalid 81.70 1.83 63 
 
3.2.2. Reanswer Choices 
The overall mean probability of reanswering was 0.20, only 0.01 lower than in 
Experiment 1. The data are illustrated in Figure 3.2. Contrary to Experiment 1, there was a 
marginally significant interaction between model and anchor, F(1,63) = 3.805, p = 0.056, ηp2= 
0.057. Participants were more likely to reattempt the multiple-model problems than their single-
model counterparts for the low-anchor problems (+0.05; t(63) = 2.379, p = 0.020), but the pattern 
disappeared for the high-anchor problems (+0.01, t(63) = 0.267, p = 0.790). Again, there was no 
anchoring effect on reanswer choices, F(1,63) = 0.244, p = 0.623, ηp2 = 0.004.  
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Figure 3.2. Mean probability of reanswering in Experiment 2 as a function of model, anchor, and 
validity. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Table 3.2. Mean FORs by model and anchor 
Model Anchor Mean Std. Error N 
Single Low 0.18 0.04 63 
 
High 0.20 0.04 63 
Multiple Low 0.23 0.04 63 
 
High 0.20 0.04 63 
 
3.2.3. Composite RT 
Experiment 1 showed that the analysis of composite RT produced similar results 
compared to the analysis of reading time alone, and there were no effects of any independent 
variables on response time. Therefore, we computed the composite RT, the combination of 
participants’ reading time and response time to the problems. We proceeded with the analysis of 
composite RT instead of analyzing reading time and response time separately, attempting to 
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collect a more precise proxy measure of answer fluency. The overall mean composite RT was 
20.02 seconds. The data are plotted in Figure 3.3. Replicating results found in Experiment 1, 
participants responded to single-model problems (M = 18.40, SD = 0.99) faster than multiple-
model problems (M = 21.64, SD = 1.36), F(1,63) = 24.920, p < .001, ηp2= 0.283. Again, the main 
effect of anchor on RTs were non-significant, F(1,63) = 0.376, p = 0.542, ηp2 = 0.093. 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean composite RT in Experiment 2 as a function of model, anchor, and validity. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
3.2.4. Accuracy 
The overall mean accuracy was 0.63. The data for accuracy are plotted in Figure 3.4. 
Contrary to Experiment 1, participants were more accurate on the single-model syllogisms (M = 
0.66, SD = 0.02) than their multiple-model counterparts (M = 0.59, SD = 0.02), F(1,63) = 13.805, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.180. There was also a main effect of validity, F(1,63) = 12.716, p = .001, ηp2 = 
0.168. The mean accuracy for valid syllogisms (M = 0.68, SD = 0.02) was higher than for invalid 
ones (M = 0.58, SD = 0.02). Consistent with Experiment 1, the interaction between model and 
validity was significant, F(1,63) = 34.986, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.357. When the syllogisms were valid, 
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single-model problems were answered more accurately than multiple-model problems (+0.19, 
t(63) = 7.994, p < 0.001), but the difference was not present when the syllogisms were invalid (-
0.04, t(63) = -1.447, p = 0.153). There was a marginally significant anchoring effect on 
accuracy4, F(1,63) = 3.849, p = .054, ηp2= 0.058. The mean accuracy for single-model 
syllogisms was slightly higher than for multiple-model problems when paired with high anchors 
(+0.08, t(63) = 2.533, p = 0.014), but the difference was smaller for problems paired with low 
anchors (+0.06, t(63) = 2.272, p = 0.026).  
 
Figure 3.4. Mean accuracy in Experiment 2 as a function of model, anchor, and validity. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 In Experiment 2, there was a marginally significant effect of the size of anchors on accuracy. This was likely to be 
a Type I error. The anchoring manipulation occurred after participants provided their responses, therefore, it was 
logically impossible that the anchors influenced participants’ accuracy on the task. 
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Table 3.3. Mean accuracy by model and validity  
Model Validity Mean Std. Error N 
Single Valid 0.77 0.02 63 
 
Invalid 0.56 0.02 63 
Multiple Valid 0.58 0.03 63 
 
Invalid 0.60 0.03 63 
 
3.2.5. Fluency Defined by Item RT 
As in Experiment 1, we computed a median composite RT for each participant. 
Composite RTs less than the median were coded as fluently generated and those that were longer 
than the median were considered as disfluent. Consistent with Experiment 1, we found that 
fluently generated responses were given higher FORs (M = 85.57, sd = 13.53) than their 
disfluent counterparts (M = 82.26, sd = 13.33), t(63) = 3.560, p = 0.001. We again compared the 
FORs of participants’ responses according to their reanswer choices. The items participants 
preferred to reanswer were given lower FORs (M = 74.46, sd = 21.26) than those they were 
unwilling to reattempt (M = 84.57, sd = 13.54), t(52) = -4.110, p < 0.001. Additionally, there was 
a fluency effect on reanswer choices, t(63) = -4.159, p < 0.001. Participants were more willing to 
choose to reanswer disfluent problems (M = 0.24, sd = 0.29) than their fluent counterparts (M = 
0.16, sd = 0.26). 
3.3. Discussion 
We attempted to remove the floor effect of reanswer choices in Experiment 1. In the 
current experiment, we modified the instructions by telling participants that “Some of the 
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problems are very difficult”, but the instruction manipulation did not increase their reanswering 
probabilities.  
3.3.1. Size of Anchors  
Consistent with the results found in Experiment 1, the size of anchors influenced FORs 
without affecting answer fluency. People gave higher FORs to high-anchor syllogisms than their 
low-anchor counterparts, but their composite RT was not subject to the anchoring effect. 
Moreover, reanswer choices were not affected by the size of anchors. These data provided 
evidence supporting Hypothesis B, which posits that cues directly influencing FOR cannot 
predict subsequent reanswer choices unless they also affect answer fluency.  
3.3.2. Number of Models 
 Replicating the effect of models on FORs from Experiment 1, the number of models 
affected people’s FORs in that single-model syllogisms were rated higher on FORs than their 
multiple-model counterparts. The latter involves representing and testing two or more models, 
requiring more cognitive effort than the former. Furthermore, the number of models also 
influenced answer fluency. That is, people solved the single-model syllogisms more fluently than 
multiple-model ones, replicating the results found in Experiment 1. However, the results on 
reanswer choices were contrary to Experiment 1.  
In the current experiment, one of the manipulated variables, number of models, failed to 
produce any effects on reanswer choices. We formed two hypotheses about the relationships 
among fluency, FOR, and reanswer choices, but both hypotheses suggest that cues (e.g., number 
of models) affecting fluency should influence FOR judgments, which in turn predict people’s 
reanswer choices. Our finding pertaining to the number of models in the current experiment 
seemed to challenge the expected set of relationships described previously. It also appeared to 
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contradict the results from the item-based RT analysis. The divergence is described as follows: 
people responded to single-model syllogisms more quickly than multiple-model problems, but 
reanswer choices did not differ between the two types of models, even though the fluency 
analyses showed that people were more likely to reanswer the slow-responding problems on the 
individual level. Considering the relationship between fluency and reanswer choices from the 
item-based RT analysis, we would expect a higher likelihood of reanswering on the multiple-
model problems since the composite RT for multiple-model syllogisms was longer (i.e., 
multiple-model syllogisms were less fluent) than single-model counterparts, but the data 
suggested otherwise. To foreshadow, we observed this null effect of number of models on 
reanswer choices in the next two experiments as well. A more detailed explanation for this 
divergence is provided in the summary section in Experiment 4, but the gist is that the relative 
answer fluency for each individual is the key predictor of reanswer choices.  
3.3.3. Accuracy  
In contrast to Experiment 1, the accuracy for single-model syllogisms was higher than 
multiple-model ones. This inconsistency might be due to sampling variability. It was possible 
that participants in the current experiment were less susceptible to compelling lures in the single-
model syllogisms than participants from Experiment 1.  
3.3.4. Validity  
We also found that the participants gave higher FORs for valid problems than invalid 
ones, which was not found in Experiment 1. According to the one-model hypothesis (Evans, 
Handley, Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999), the reasoners construct one representation of the 
premises, if the conclusion is necessitated by the premises, the syllogism is judged to be valid; it 
is judged invalid otherwise. Invalid syllogisms were more difficult because the conclusion might 
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be consistent with the first model reasoners constructed, but it did not necessarily follow from 
the premises. Therefore, more than one representation of the premises was possibly required to 
evaluate invalid syllogisms. Reasoners might be aware that the current model would not be 
sufficient to determine the validity of the syllogism, but they were uncertain about how to 
proceed (Quayle & Ball, 2000). This experience is referred to as metacognitive uncertainty, 
which may have been reflected in our FOR measure. This may be the reason that lower FORs 
were given to the invalid syllogisms than their valid counterparts. Furthermore, the interaction 
between model and validity on FORs was also replicated in the current experiment as people 
gave higher FORs for single- than multiple-model syllogisms when the syllogisms were valid, 
but there was no significant difference between the two problem types for invalid problems. We 
do not have an obvious explanation for this result.  
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Chapter 4. Experiment 3 
The third experiment served as a control experiment. The procedure followed the 
previous two experiments except that the question pertaining to FOR was eliminated. The 
concern was that incorporating FOR judgements may facilitate deliberate thinking, which would 
in turn lead to overstated effects like longer composite RT, increased accuracy, and a higher 
probability of reanswering. The goal of the following two experiments was to address this 
concern and verify that adding in the metacognitive question would not induce changes in 
people’s behaviours. We hypothesized that the results on reanswer choices, composite RT, and 
accuracy in the current experiment would mirror the previous two experiments.  
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
Sixty-four participants (37 males and 27 females, M = 21 years) were recruited from the 
University of Saskatchewan. These participants took part in the study for partial course credit.  
4.1.2. Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were the same as Experiment 1 and 2 with the exception of 
the FOR question. The participants in the current experiment did not see the FOR question. After 
they saw the question with the anchoring information, they then proceeded to indicate whether 
they would like to solve the previous problem again.  
4.2. Results 
According to participants’ self-reports, responses that were not answered intuitively were 
discarded, which accounted for 3.7% of the data. A 2 (Anchor [low, high]) x 2 (Model [single, 
multiple]) x 2 (Validity [valid, invalid]) repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on 3 
dependent variables: reanswer choices, composite RT, and accuracy. Results with p < 0.05 were 
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reported as significant. Paired t-tests were used to examine the simple main effects of significant 
interactions. 
4.2.1. Reanswer Choices 
The overall mean probability of reanswering was 0.20. Consistent with Experiment 2, the 
main effect of model on reanswer choices was non-significant, F(1,63) = 0.169, p = 0.683, ηp2 = 
0.003. Consistent with both Experiment 1 and 2, the main effect of anchor was also non-
significant, F(1,63) = 2.522, p = 0.117, ηp2 = 0.038.  
4.2.2. Composite RT  
The composite RT was computed exactly like the prior experiments. The overall mean 
composite RT was 15.74 seconds. The data are illustrated in Figure 4.1. Consistent with the 
previous experiments, we found a main effect of model on composite RTs, F(1,63) = 44.777, p < 
0.001 , ηp2 = 0.415. Participants responded to the single-model syllogisms (M = 14.48, sd = 0.66) 
more quickly than their multiple-model counterparts (M = 17.01, sd = 0.80). However, there was 
also a main effect of validity, F(1,63) = 6.771, p = 0.012 , ηp2 = 0.097. The valid syllogisms were 
answered faster (M = 15.27, sd = 0.67) than the invalid ones (M = 16.22, sd = 0.79) by 
participants. Again, the main effect of anchor was non-significant, F(1,63) = 0.008, p = .930, ηp2 
< 0.001.  
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Figure 4.1. Mean composite RTs in Experiment 3 as a function of model, anchor, and validity. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
4.2.3. Accuracy  
The overall mean accuracy was 0.61. Data are plotted in Figure 4.2. Consistent with 
Experiment 1 and 2, the accuracy for valid syllogisms (M = 0.68, sd = 0.02) was higher than for 
invalid problems (M = 0.54, sd = 0.02), F(1,63) = 21.702, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.256. Similar to the 
previous experiments, the interaction between model and validity was also significant, F(1,63) = 
37.487, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.373. The values of the interaction are displayed in Table 4.1. When the 
problems were valid, participants were more accurate on the single-model syllogisms (+0.14, 
t(63) = 5.391, p < 0.001), whereas their accuracy was higher on the multiple-model syllogisms 
when the problems were invalid (-0.09, t(63) = -2.871, p = 0.006). Consistent with Experiment 1, 
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the main effect of model on accuracy was non-significant, F(1,63) = 1.969, p = 0.165, ηp2 = 0.03.
 
Figure 4.2. Mean accuracy in Experiment 3 as a function of model, anchor, and validity. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
Table 4.1. Mean accuracy by model and validity  
Model Validity Mean Std. Error N 
Single Valid 0.76 0.02 63 
 
Invalid 0.49 0.02 63 
Multiple Valid 0.61 0.03 63 
 
Invalid 0.58 0.03 63 
 
4.2.4. Fluency Defined by Item RT 
For the item-RT analysis, we again calculated a median composite RT for every 
participant. Similar to findings in Experiment 1 and 2, people had a tendency to reattempt the 
problems that were answered less fluently (M = 0.22, sd = 0.22) than those that were answered 
more fluently (M = 0.18, sd = 0.25), t(63) = -1.890, p = 0.063.  
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4.3. Discussion 
The results from the current experiment closely replicated Experiments 1 and 2, which 
are summarized in Tables 5.2 – 5.6 in the next chapter for comparison purposes. With respect to 
reanswer choices, number of models had no effect on people’s preference for reattempting the 
problems, which was consistent with Experiment 2. This finding neither supported Hypothesis A 
nor Hypothesis B. Both hypotheses proposed that cues affecting answer fluency (e.g., number of 
models) would subsequently influence FORs, which in turn predict people’s subsequent 
reanswer choices. However, the item-based RT analysis showed that people were more likely to 
reanswer the less fluent problems (i.e., multiple-model syllogisms according to composite RT 
data), even though overall they did not show preference for reattempting multiple-model over 
single-model syllogisms. The conundrum is further discussed in the next section.  
Due to mixed results concerning the effect of models on reanswer choices in the previous 
two experiments, it was less clear whether incorporating FOR judgements had an impact on 
people’s reanswer choices. The argument is that including FOR judgements may artificially 
influence people’s subsequent reanswer choices, possibly alerting them to be more reflective on 
the succeeding task. However, evidence from the anchoring effect on reanswer choices hinted 
otherwise. The size of anchors exerted no effect on reanswer choices across three experiments. 
This consistent null effect of anchoring on reanswer choices suggested that incorporating FOR 
questions did not change people’s reanswer choices compared to experiments without FORs. In 
other words, the size of anchors had no effect on reanswer choices regardless of the presence of 
FOR judgements. We needed to replicate these results found in Experiment 3, and that was the 
reason for conducting the fourth experiment.  
 
  
 
44 
Chapter 5. Experiment 4 
In this fourth experiment, the goal was to replicate Experiment 3 in attempt to verify that 
including FOR judgements would not affect people’s behaviours on the reasoning task.  
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Participants 
Sixty-four participants (36 males and 28 females, M = 28 years) were recruited from the 
bulletin board on the University of Saskatchewan website. They received $7.50 for their 
participation instead of receiving partial course credit as in the previous experiments.  
5.1.2. Materials and Procedure 
The stimuli, design and procedure were the same as Experiment 3.  
5.2. Results 
Based on participants’ self-reports, deliberate responses were excluded, which was about 
1.7% of the data. A 2 (Anchor [low, high]) x 2 (Model [single, multiple]) x 2 (Validity [valid, 
invalid]) repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on 3 dependent variables: reanswer 
choices, composite RT and accuracy. Results with p < 0.05 were reported as significant. Paired t-
tests were employed to reveal the simple main effects of significant interactions. 
5.2.1. Reanswer Choices 
The overall mean probability of reanswering was 0.318. Consistent with Experiment 3, 
there was no main effect of model on reanswer choices, F(1,63) = 0.002, p = 0.969, ηp2 < 0.001. 
The main effect of anchor was also non-significant, F(1,63) = 2.622, p = 0.110, ηp2 = 0.040.  
5.2.2. Composite RT 
The overall mean composite RT was 17.52 seconds. Data are displayed in Figure 5.1. 
Again, we found a main effect of model on composite RTs, F(1,63) = 38.140, p < 0.001 , ηp2 = 
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0.377. Participants were faster at solving the single-model syllogisms (M = 15.91, sd = 0.76) 
than multiple-model ones (M = 19.13, sd = 1.05). Participants also responded to the valid 
problems (M = 16.94, sd = 0.84) more quickly than their invalid counterparts (M = 18.10, sd = 
0.97), F(1,63) = 6.001, p = 0.017 , ηp2 = 0.087. The main effect of anchor was non-significant, 
F(1,63) = 2.622, p = .110, ηp2 = 0.040. 
 
Figure 5.1. Mean composite RTs as a function of model, anchor, and validity. Error bars 
represent standard errors.  
5.2.3. Accuracy  
The overall mean accuracy was 0.66. Data are plotted in Figure 5.2. Consistent with 
previous experiments, there was a main effect of validity on accuracy, F(1,63) = 29.807, p < 
0.001, ηp2 = 0.321. Participants were more accurate on the valid syllogisms (M = 0.74, sd = 0.02) 
than their invalid counterparts (M = 0.58, sd = 0.02). Similar to previous experiments, the 
interaction between model and validity was also significant, F(1,63) = 37.103, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 
0.371. Participants correctly answered more single-model problems than multiple-model ones 
when the syllogisms were valid (+0.14, t(63) = 5.325, p < 0.001), but they were more accurate on 
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multiple-model problems than their single-model counterparts for the invalid problems (-0.09, 
t(63) = -3.541, p = 0.001).
 
Figure 5.2. Mean accuracy as a function of model, anchor, and validity. Error bars represent 
standard errors.  
Table 5.1. Mean Accuracy by model and validity  
Model Validity Mean Std. Error N 
Single Valid 0.81 0.02 63 
 
Invalid 0.53 0.03 63 
Multiple Valid 0.67 0.03 63 
 
Invalid 0.62 0.03 63 
 
5.2.4. Fluency Defined by Item RT 
We again calculated a median composite RT for every participant, and divided their 
responses into two categories, fluent and disfluent trials. Consistent with the prior experiments, 
we found a significant effect of fluency on reanswer choices, t(63) = -3.454, p = 0.001. 
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Participants were more likely to select problems they solved less fluently to reanswer (M = 0.35, 
sd = 0.31) compared to those they solved fluently (M = 0.28, sd = 0.33).  
5.2.5. Results Summary 
For each of the four experiments, results with p < 0.05 are summarized in Tables 5.2 – 
5.6. As can be seen from these tables, the results associated with FORs in Experiments 1 and 2 
were similar. Furthermore, Experiments 2, 3, and 4 replicated most of the effects on composite 
RT, accuracy, and fluency from Experiment 1. Contrarily, the effect of number of models on 
reanswer choices only appeared in Experiment 1.  
Table 5.2 A summary of results on FORs across four experiments. A check mark represents the 
presence of a significant effect. NA denotes the effect was not measured in the experiment. 
FORs  
    
  E1 E2 E3 E4 
Model ✔ ✔ NA NA 
Anchor ✔ ✔ NA NA 
Validity   ✔ NA NA 
Model x 
Validity 
✔ ✔ NA NA 
 
Table 5.3 A summary of results on reanswer choices across four experiments.  
 
Reanswer choices 
   
  E1 E2 E3 E4 
Model ✔ 
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Table 5.4 A summary of results for composite RT across four experiments. 
    
Composite 
RT 
    
  E1 E2 E3 E4 
Model ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Validity     ✔ ✔ 
Model x 
Validity 
✔       
 
Table 5.5 A summary of accuracy results across four experiments. 
    
Accuracy 
    
  E1 E2 E3 E4 
Model   ✔     
Validity ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Model x 
Validity 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
Table 5.6 A summary of fluency-related results across four experiments. 
    
Fluency  
    
  E1 E2 E3 E4 
Fluency & 
FOR 
✔ ✔ NA NA 
FOR & 
reanswer 
✔ ✔ NA NA 
Fluency & 
reanswer 
✔ ✔ 0.06 ✔ 
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To verify that including FOR did not change people’s accuracy and composite RT, we 
compared the results from experiments with FOR judgements to those experiments without 
them, namely the control experiments. The first two experiments containing the FOR questions 
were treated as one group, whereas the control experiments were considered as the other group. 
This formed a 2 x (Anchor [low, high]) x 2 (Model [single, multiple]) x 2 (Validity [valid, 
invalid]) repeated measures ANOVA with group [FOR, control] as the between-subject factor.  
Due to some missing data on composite RT in Experiment 1, the FOR group comprised 105 
participants instead of 128 participants. For composite RT, none of the independent variables 
interacted with group. Additionally, the effect of group on composite RT was non-significant, 
F(1, 231) = 3.017, p = 0.084, ηp2 = 0.013. To examine reanswer choices, none of the independent 
variables interacted with group except for number of models. The interaction between model and 
group was significant, F(1, 254) = 6.203, p = 0.013, ηp2 = 0.024. To decompose the interaction, 
the effect of model on reanswer choices was significant for the FOR group (mean difference = 
0.38, p = 0.001), but not for the control group (mean difference = 0.003, p = 0.786). This 
significant effect within the FOR group was present because the effect was found in Experiment 
1, but not in Experiment 2. 
 Nevertheless, the effect of group on reanswer choices was non-significant, F(1, 254) = 
2.642, p = 0.105, ηp2 = 0.010. For accuracy, there was no significant interaction between group 
and any of the independent variables. The effect of group was again non-significant on accuracy, 
F(1, 254) = 0.511, p = 0.475, ηp2 = 0.002. We also compared the effect of fluency on reanswer 
choices between the FOR group and the control group. Again, there was no significant difference 
found between the two groups regarding the effect of fluency on reanswer choices, F(1, 254) = 
2.93, p = 0.88, ηp2 = 0.011. By comparing the dependent variables (composite RT, accuracy, 
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reanswer choices, and answer fluency) between experiments with FORs and without FORs, we 
can tentatively conclude that including FORs would not affect people’s performance on the task. 
5.3. Discussion 
The comparison between experiments containing FORs and those without FORs showed 
that people’s accuracy and composite RT were not affected when FOR judgements were 
included in the experiments. Moreover, there was no anchoring effect on reanswer choices across 
the four experiments (with and without FOR questions), which suggested incorporating the FOR 
question did not alter people’s reanswer choices. We can conclude that including FOR 
judgements in experiments does not affect people’s performance on the reasoning task, that is, 
their accuracy, composite RT, and possibly their reanswer choices.  
The only significant difference found between the manipulated and the control 
experiments was the effect of number of models on reanswer choices. This difference was 
mainly driven by Experiment 1, because the effect of number of models on reanswer choices was 
only observed in Experiment 1, but not in the following experiments. Therefore, Experiments 1 
and 2 overall produced a significant effect on reanswer choices by the number of models, but the 
effect on reanswer choices was non-significant in both Experiments 3 and 4, which resulted in a 
significant interaction effect.  
We proposed in Hypothesis B that variables affecting fluency would influence FOR, 
which in turn would predict people’s subsequent reanswer choices. The data from Experiment 1 
supported this hypothesis, but the remaining three experiments failed to demonstrate the 
anticipated effects on reanswer choices. More specifically, the effect of number of models on 
reanswer choices was absent, although the relationship between fluency and reanswer choices 
held true. In other words, overall less fluent problems were more likely to be reanswered, but 
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people did not choose to reanswer multiple-model syllogisms over single-model counterparts, 
even though the former were solved slower.  
To solve the conundrum, we categorized all of the syllogisms used in each experiment 
into one of four conditions: Single & Fluent, Single & Disfluent, Multiple & Fluent, and 
Multiple & Disfluent. Each syllogism was either a single-model or multiple-model problem with 
a composite RT either faster or slower than the median composite RT. The number of syllogisms 
in each condition are displayed in Table. 5.7. As shown by the table, the majority of the single-
model syllogisms were fluent, and the multiple-model problems were less fluent. However, there 
still existed a substantial proportion of single-model problems that were disfluent, and multiple-
model problems that were fluent. These data suggested that the disfluent single-model problems 
might have counteracted the fluent ones, mitigating the fluency effect produced by the models on 
reanswer choices. That is, the outcome turned out to be null for reanswer choices because single-
model problems were not necessarily fluent; thus, its predictability on reanswer choices was 
reduced. Similar reasoning was applied to the multiple-model problems. On the other hand, the 
item-based RT analysis was to compare each individual’s composite RT to their own median 
composite RT, which made half of the problems faster than the median (i.e., fluent) and the other 
half slower than the median (i.e. disfluent) regardless of which model was involved. Again, 
single-model syllogisms were not always fluent in comparison.  
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Table 5.7 Number of syllogisms in each condition for all four experiments. 
 Single. Fluent Single. Disfluent Multiple. Fluent Multiple. Disfluent 
E1 476 421 435 477 
E2 556 444 449 545 
E3 568 422 426 556 
E4 577 435 437 564 
 
The participants in the present study were paid instead of receiving course credit as in the 
previous experiments. The probability of reattempting the problems was about 10% higher in the 
current experiment compared to Experiments 1 - 3, but none of the manipulated variables 
produced any significant effects on people’s reanswer choices, replicating previous results. This 
finding contradicted our prior account postulating that the absence of the anchoring effect was 
due to a floor effect of the reanswer choices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
53 
Chapter 6. General Discussion 
A series of four experiments investigated the effect of FORs on reanswer choices by 
directly manipulating FORs. We attempted to answer the question: without the effect of answer 
fluency, is a manipulation of FOR sufficient to predict people’s reanswer choices? To this end, 
we examined a cue that consistently affected answer fluency (i.e., number of models) and a cue 
that directly influenced FOR without affecting answer fluency (i.e., the size of anchors). We 
proposed two hypotheses, attempting to account for the relationships amongst answer fluency, 
FOR, and reanswer choice. Hypothesis A: cues can either directly or indirectly (through the 
effect of answer fluency) influence FORs, which in turn predict people’s subsequent reanswer 
choices. According to this hypothesis, we predicted higher FORs for single-model syllogisms 
and for higher-anchor problems, and that people would be less likely to choose these problems to 
reanswer. The alternative, hypothesis B, suggested that only cues affecting answer fluency and 
FORs would subsequently predict people’s reanswer choices. More specifically, we predicted 
both the size of anchors and number of models would influence FORs, but reanswer choices 
would only be affected by the latter, because it would also affect answer fluency.  
6.1. Answer Fluency, FOR, and Reanswer Choices  
Our data showed that people provided higher FORs for problems paired with high 
anchors and for single-model syllogisms, consistent with both of the hypotheses. In one of four 
experiments, people were less likely to choose single-model syllogisms to reanswer because they 
were more fluent than their multiple-model counterparts, whereas there was a lack of anchoring 
effect on reanswer choices. Therefore, the results from only Experiment 1 supported hypothesis 
B, indicating that FOR can predict people’s subsequent reanswer choices only if it is affected by 
answer fluency, but not directly through other cues. However, this effect of models on reanswer 
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choices was absent in the remaining three experiments. To solve the conundrum, we counted the 
number of syllogisms and classified them into one of four categories: fluent single-model 
problems, disfluent single-model problems, fluent multiple-model problems, and disfluent 
multiple-model problems. We found that a substantial number of single-model items were 
actually less fluent than their multiple-model counterparts, which was not anticipated. Similarly, 
many multiple-models were fluent instead of being disfluent. If an individual reanswered the 
fluent problems, there would be a mix of single- and multiple-model items amongst their 
reanswer choices. In other words, even if one was more likely to reanswer fluent than disfluent 
problems, this might not translate into an effect of model on fluency. Therefore, reanswer 
choices are determined by the relative fluency of problems for an individual, according to his or 
her own median composite RT.  
We also considered two other possible explanations to explain the lack of anchoring 
effects and the effect of number of models on reanswer choices in the last three experiments. 
One possible explanation is that the low likelihood of reanswering might have impeded us from 
observing the effect of anchoring or models on reanswer choices. The syllogisms used in the 
experiments might be too difficult for the participants to solve, resulting in a floor effect on 
reanswer choices. Nonetheless, this explanation was made less likely given that the probability 
of reanswering was increased to approximately 30% in Experiment 4, and neither the effect of 
number of models nor the size of anchors on reanswer choices were observed. The second 
account posits that FOR might not predict people’s subsequent intention towards reattempting 
the problems as measured by their reanswer choices. This explanation was also not likely 
considering that FOR was associated with reanswer choices on the individual level according to 
the item-based RT analysis. The observation that people were more likely to reanswer  
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problems that were given lower FORs based on the item-based RT analysis suggested FOR was, 
in fact, able to predict reanswer choices. Thus, this possible explanation was not supported by 
our results.  
6.2. FOR and Accuracy  
In support of our hypotheses on FORs, variables such as the size of anchors and number 
of models consistently predicted FORs regardless of accuracy in these experiments. That is, high 
anchor values and single-model syllogisms elevated people’s FOR judgements, but their 
accuracy on the reasoning task was unchanged. Our results were similar to previous findings that 
confidence judgements and accuracy are dissociated in the realm of reasoning (Bajšanski et al., 
2014; Quayle & Ball, 2000; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2011).  
6.3. The Outcome of Including FOR 
We further tested the outcome of including FOR judgements in the experiments in order 
to rule out the concern that the act of adding FOR may change people’s performance on the 
reasoning task. By comparing the results from experiments containing the FOR question to those 
without it, we showed that people behaved similarly with and without FOR judgements 
regarding accuracy and composite RT. These results suggest that including the FOR question 
does not inflate reflective behaviours such as longer RTs and increased accuracy. The results 
associated with reanswer choices were less clear due to inconsistent results across the four 
experiments. Nevertheless, the absence of the anchoring effect on reanswer choices across four 
experiments suggested incorporating FOR judgements in the experiments did not alter people’s 
reanswer choices.  
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6.4. Comparison to Metamemory Literature 
Our experiments partially replicated the research conducted by Yang et al. (2018). Both 
studies showed that people’s subsequent judgements were susceptible to the anchoring effect, 
even though different measures of judgements were employed in the two research paradigms. 
More specifically, we assessed people’s FORs, and Yang and colleagues measured JOLs. We 
were unable to find the effect of anchoring on reanswer choices as Yang et al. did for restudy 
choices, possibly for the reasons discussed above. In addition, we attempted to adhere to the 
procedure of the previous research as closely as possible, but we used a different task and 
measures for the purpose of our experiments. The task involved in our experiments was solving 
syllogisms, whereas Yang et al.’s task was memorizing word-pairs. The former requires 
participants to think about the problems, which was more cognitively demanding than 
memorization. The anchor value might act as a superficial cue that only affected people’s 
judgement represented by the measure, namely FOR, but not their cognitive process or 
experience related to problem-solving.  
6.5. Limitations and Future Research 
The experiments have a few caveats that need to be addressed. We asked the participants 
to provide a reanswer choice for each problem, and the question was phrased as the following: 
“To improve your overall score, would you like to attempt to solve this problem again after you 
have solved all of the problems?” The phrasing of this question might measure people’s 
motivation more than their actual behaviours. We adopted the methodology of asking for 
participants’ reanswer choices instead of making them solve the problems again in order to 
replicate prior research (Yang et al., 2018). The drawback is that this methodology prevented us 
from comparing our data to previous meta-reasoning work that measured participants’ actual 
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reanswering behaviours (Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2013; Thompson & Johnson, 
2014). In these prior studies, participants solved each problem twice, and their rethinking time 
and answer change were denoted as reanswering behaviours. In contrast, our experiments 
measured people’s reanswer choices, which might be different than rethinking and answer-
change behaviours. Thus, we need to take into account the possibility that the relationship 
between FOR and reanswering choices is not completely parallel with the relationship between 
FOR and reanswer behaviours.  
 Additionally, participants were not timed under a deadline for their intuitive responses. 
Prior research indicates that FORs increase over time (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; 
Thompson et al., 2011). In our experiments, participants might have reflected on the problems 
and provided higher FORs, which in turn led to lower probability of reanswer choices. We tried 
to control for any deliberate responses by eliminating trials that participants failed to answer 
intuitively according to their self-reports, but the validity of the self-reports remained uncertain. 
Moreover, people’s likelihood of reanswering was relatively low in the first three experiments, 
which made the interpretation of the effect on reanswer choices more complicated. To address 
these limitations, future research could incentivize the participants to be more engaged in the 
task by rewarding them for each question they answer correctly. This rewarding method could 
motivate participants to reanswer more problems. Another direction would be measuring 
people’s actual reanswering behaviours with the same paradigm and compare the results with 
previous research.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
The data from a series of four experiments supported the hypothesis that only cues 
affecting both answer fluency and FOR can predict people’s subsequent reanswer choices to 
some extent. We could not completely verify the above hypothesis, however, because the cue 
that affected answer fluency (i.e., number of models) in our experiments was not as reliable 
when examining reanswer choices. Future research will need to use a more effective cue to 
investigate the relationships amongst answer fluency, FOR, and reanswer choices. We further 
provided evidence supporting previous research that confidence judgements are not related to 
accuracy of the reasoning task (Bajšanski et al., 2014; Quayle & Ball, 2000; Shynkaruk & 
Thompson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2011). Additionally, we showed that adding FOR judgements 
to the experiments did not change people’s performance on the reasoning task, addressing the 
concern about the use of FORs in experiments. 
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Appendix 
In a syllogism, a quantifier indicates the scope of the given sets. For example, words like 
“all” and “no” are categorized as universal, whereas “some” is referred to as particular. The 
quantifier of each statement may be affirmative or negative; that is, the quantifier can either 
affirm that one group belongs to another group or negates it. Therefore, the quantifiers can have 
four possible forms, which are also known as moods (Johnson-Laird & Bara,1984). Examples 
with the common single-letter abbreviations are listed as follows: 
 
All philosophers are logicians — affirmative-universal (A) 
Some teachers are painters— affirmative-particular (I) 
No musicians are engineers — negative-universal (E) 
Some gardeners are not models — negative-particular (O) 
 
 Another factor in a syllogism that needs to be considered is “figure”. Figure refers to the 
sequence in which the A, B and C terms are presented. There are four types of figure, which are 
listed below: 
 
A-B    B-A     A-B     B-A  
B-C     C-B     C-B      B-C  
 
Both mood and figure affect performance (Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978). 
Specifically, the difficulty of the syllogisms is dependent on mood and figure interacting with 
each other.  
